Category: Program Implementation

Of Interest: SIGAR’s Audit Report on PROMOTE Program in Afghanistan.

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The name of the audit says it all, don’t you think?

“Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs (Promote):  USAID Needs to Assess This $216 Million Program’s Achievements and the Afghan Government’s Ability to Sustain Them”

There was so much excitement at the time of the program’s announcement by the then USAID’s Administrator at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), which I remember well.   It was a grandiose $216 million project with the expectation that other international donors would contribute an additional $200 million in funds.  SIGAR’s recommendations are three:

1. Conduct an overall assessment of Promote and use the results to adjust the program and measure future program performance….

2. Provide written guidance and training to contracting officer’s representatives on maintaining records in a consistent, accurate manner. …

3. Conduct a new sustainability analysis for the program.

Of the SIGAR recommendations to USAID above, I find #2 quite sad, because in my experience, record keeping has deteriorated to the point of oblivion.  Institutional knowledge has waned in many organizations, whether they belong to the private sector or the public one.

Anyone involved in government contracting work ought to read this audit, because it highlights some major flaws in how we run (or not!) multi-million dollar taxpayer-funded programs.

You can read more about the audit at the Stars and Stripes.

Of Interest: SIGAR’s New Lessons Learnt Report on Afghanistan

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The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released at the end of May 2018 its latest “lessons learnt” report covering the period 2002-2017.  It is chock full of information for anyone who is interested in “development” work.

For those who follow “rule of law” issues, and especially for those who actually are working in Afghan-related projects, the following excerpts strike, at least to me, a very familiar chord.

Even within dispute resolution, the U.S. government chose to focus on formal rule of law, rather than informal rule of law, also called traditional dispute resolution (TDR). TDR in Afghanistan employs a varying mixture of traditional, community-specific norms, and Islamic legal principles, or sharia. 1015 As early as 2007, international legal experts highlighted the coalition’s inattention to informal justice, even though an estimated 80–90 percent of Afghan disputes are handled through TDR, and many Afghans have more faith in it than in formal dispute resolution. 1016

The U.S. government spent more than $1 billion on rule of law programming in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2015, of which less than $100 million (approximately 10 percent) was spent on enhancing informal rule of law. 1022 State’s 2009 rule of law strategy—the only one it drafted—recognized the importance of TDR to Afghans, even calling it a “pillar” of the coalition’s effort; however, the balance between funding for formal and informal rule of law programming did not seem to reflect this recognition. 1023  Worse, the kind of dispute resolution promoted by formal rule of law programming was not only considered corrupt, but also foreign to most rural Afghans.

In my many years of working in international settings doing “development” work, I have found that one of the biggest problems is overcoming individual egos and the posturing that comes with those egos.  “Development” work is not just altruistic:  there is a lot of money to be made and prestige to be gained.  There is a door that is always “revolving” between the implementer, the donor, the supervising entity, the inspecting authority, the academicians, and other intellectuals.  It is human nature.

However, once in a while, it is good to read that some of the lonely and knowledgeable individuals who pointed out some of the flaws in design were vindicated.   Note that I don’t use the term “expert”, because, in my work, most experts are really “Rupertos the “expertos””.  (My own label for the last few years has been “subject matter expert”!).

Fraud in Procurement – What Auditors Miss.

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The Procurement Fraud Handbook issued by the US General Services Administration (GSA) has a general definition of fraud (emphasis below is mine):

Generally, fraud is defined as a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment, a misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in its truth to induce another person to act, and unconscionable dealing.  A common law act of fraud must contain the following elements:  false representation or concealment of a material fact, knowledge of a statement’s falsity, intent to deceive, reliance by the deceived party, and damage to the deceived party.  The civil False Claims Act modifies this definition to include reckless disregard.

THE FRAUD TRIANGLE
fraud1

According to the Handbook, the above Fraud Triangle was developed by Donald Cressey, a leading expert on the sociology of crime.

I was especially interested in the “Attitude/Rationalization” factor, because the GSA’s Office of the Inspector General states that in an audit,

“rationalization is the element that auditors are least likely to determine… Individuals who commit organizational fraud may have different motives from those who commit fraud for their own individual benefit…  A more subtle motivation relates to increased self-esteem or co-worker/supervisor praise or envy.”

I find that when reading about fraud in procurement, examples usually used are of a contractor’s risk for committing the fraud.  Unfortunately, sometimes the fraud is committed in collusion with government officials.  In my opinion, the latter is the most pernicious type of fraud.

Of Interest: OIG Audits, Inspections and Reports – A Window into Contracting Operations of the US State Department

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Some of us have quirky habits.  I happen to love etymology and thoroughly enjoy doing research.  As my children can well attest, I drilled into them never really to believe what they read or are told is fact; always verify the information and go to the source, whenever possible.  Even those “experts” in their fields, whether in government or out, make mistakes or may not know their subject matter as well as they think they do.

One of the things I learnt working on U.S. Government programs, whether they be contracts or grants, is that the Offices of the Inspector General (OIG) of the various government agencies put out some interesting reports that have a wealth of information.

I find these audits/reports very useful to understand:

  • what a particular agency’s strengths and weaknesses might be,
  • what the contractor/grantee can do to help the agency overcome its weaknesses,
  • what the competition’s competencies and limitations are.

Even if the audit or report pertains to a certain agency or distinct area of performance or a specific geographical place, many of the issues usually addressed do apply across the board.

For example, the latest OIG audit on contract invoicing review by the Bureau of Narcotics and International Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) actually explains the invoicing process as well as the regulations that apply to invoicing.   Program implementation benefits immensely from having program managers or contracts representatives aware of these resources.

Of course, keeping abreast of all these resources requires an enormous amount of time devoted outside of the regular work day.  However, if you are quirky, like me, it is extremely rewarding!