Some of us have quirky habits. I happen to love etymology and thoroughly enjoy doing research. As my children can well attest, I drilled into them never really to believe what they read or are told is fact; always verify the information and go to the source, whenever possible. Even those “experts” in their fields, whether in government or out, make mistakes or may not know their subject matter as well as they think they do.
One of the things I learnt working on U.S. Government programs, whether they be contracts or grants, is that the Offices of the Inspector General (OIG) of the various government agencies put out some interesting reports that have a wealth of information.
I find these audits/reports very useful to understand:
- what a particular agency’s strengths and weaknesses might be,
- what the contractor/grantee can do to help the agency overcome its weaknesses,
- what the competition’s competencies and limitations are.
Even if the audit or report pertains to a certain agency or distinct area of performance or a specific geographical place, many of the issues usually addressed do apply across the board.
For example, the latest OIG audit on contract invoicing review by the Bureau of Narcotics and International Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) actually explains the invoicing process as well as the regulations that apply to invoicing. Program implementation benefits immensely from having program managers or contracts representatives aware of these resources.
Of course, keeping abreast of all these resources requires an enormous amount of time devoted outside of the regular work day. However, if you are quirky, like me, it is extremely rewarding!
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) produced an audit of a Department of Defense (DOD) $635 million program in Afghanistan -the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), which yields some self-evident and interesting points:
Taking the following actions might improve such an entity’s ability to implement programming and achieve results:
• Define the entity’s mission, scope, and objectives in clear and measureable terms.
• Authorize the entity for longer than 1-year intervals to reduce uncertainty about its future and allow it time to plan ahead for its projects.
• Direct the entity to:
o Develop contract planning policies that emphasize the importance of understanding host-country or local dynamics and obtaining buy-in from all stakeholders before executing a project;
o Develop and implement action plans to minimize the award of oncompetitive and sole-source contracts;
o Develop and implement action plans to ensure that its staff has adequate training and experience in developing contract requirements and providing contract oversight;
o Work with a single primary contract administration office when developing performance work statements to ensure consistency in drafting requirements;
o Develop management systems to track project metrics, civilian travel, and government-furnished equipment;
o Develop and implement a document retention policy; and
o Develop monitoring, evaluation, and sustainment plans for all projects so that their economic impacts can be accurately measured and sustained, and if necessary, assets can be transferred to an enduring partner.
SIGAR mentions that DOD was given the opportunity to comment on the audit. Something that struck me was SIGAR’s comment to DOD’s comment, which -in my experience- is the crux of development aid or foreign assistance (emphasis in bold below is mine):
It is important to understand the difference between projects that met or partially met their contractual deliverables and projects that actually met or partially met their program objectives. DOD is correct in observing that this report finds the contracts directly supporting 16 TFBSO projects generally met their contract deliverables and that contracts directly supporting 12 projects partially met their contract deliverables (or in one case, met them after significant delay). However, just because some TFBSO contractors met their contract deliverables in whole or in part does not necessarily mean that the projects they supported had successful or sustainable outcomes. For example, there are several documented cases where TFBSO contractors completed construction and equipment of a facility, but TFBSO was unable to locate a private company able to operate and maintain it, leading that facility to fall into a state of disuse or disrepair. Furthermore, as we note in the report, because TFBSO did not consistently track outcomes data, such as the jobs created and government revenues generated by their projects, TFBSO was generally unable to demonstrate whether its projects met its overall objectives to “reduce violence, enhance stability, and support economic normalcy in Afghanistan.”
At the end of the day, what worries me is that many in government and the private sector voice these concerns; however, not often are the solutions offered taken into account, or, worse still, they are quickly forgotten. In my own experience, these concerns and suggestions have been made for decades. I have a theory -which I will try to articulate later- as to why we seem to reinvent the wheel…